So it's been awhile since I posted but I have noticed three things in the news lately, meaning since my last post in February, that are of interest to me as the author of this blog. We'll start with the latest and greatest.
1. Donald Trump has asked Congress to create a sixth branch of the military focused on space called the Space Force. Readers may recall that this was one of planks of the Paddywhack Platform. I've seen a lot of funny stuff lately mocking the proposed "Space Force", but I stand by everything I wrote six years ago in 2012. The primary utility of space is communications through satellites. Virtually all military concerns regarding space revolve around earth-orbiting satellites. Due to the difficult nature of space travel, most of the time these satellites are operated remotely. This means any military operations in space will be heavily dependent on signals intelligence, i.e. hacking and cyberwarfare. The "Space Force" should therefore look a lot less like Star Wars and a lot more like a bunch of skinny bespectacled computer geeks sitting at computers. Given that this "Space Force" will already be focused on cyberwarfare due to the nature of warfare in space, it makes sense to grant the "Space Force" primacy in cyberwarfare, or cyberspace, as well as in space itself. If that's what Trump is after, then I wholeheartedly support it. Cyberwarfare is now more than ever a continuous national security concern with multiple state actors currently taking advantage of the inability of traditional U.S. defense institutions to combat them. It's past time we do something about that, at least six years past time.
2. The Turks have invaded Syria not to attack ISIS, but to attack the Kurds there. I came about as close to predicting this as I could have without actually doing so back in 2015. To quote myself:
"Turkey is far more likely to use military force against the Kurds than against ISIS, but they have been prevented from doing so because the U.S. supports the Kurds."
It is true that Turkey used to restrict themselves when dealing with the Kurds due to the U.S. That has obviously changed, probably because the Russian/Iranian/Allawite axis is the most powerful interest in Syria right now, and Turkey is consequently feeling much less inclined to restrict their behavior because of the U.S. The Russian axis is committed to Assad's government controlling all of Syria. The Kurds are an obstacle to that, and so Turkey is feeling much more confident conducting operations against the Kurds as long as they make it clear they have no long term territorial designs in Syria.
In addition, ISIS is now out of the picture, which has also changed Turkey's calculus. Quoting from myself again:
"Why did Turkey shoot down a Russian plane? Because Russia supports Assad against ISIS, and the Turks like ISIS. They are ideologically, religiously and ethnically aligned with ISIS, but more importantly, ISIS is fighting the Kurds."
No more ISIS? No more Turkish problem with the Russians. Again, as long as Turkey maintains no territorial interests intersecting with Assad, and they never had any in the first place, Turkish interests regarding the Syrian Kurds now align with the Russian axis in the region, and their primary conflict with the Russians has been rendered moot. We should begin to see Turkey aligning themselves closer to the Russians and farther from the U.S. in the future over the Kurdish question and the fact that while the Russians are maintaining a serious, long-term policy backed by hard power, the U.S. seems more interested in what the Kardashians are doing. It's hard to imagine Sunni Turkey finding much common cause with the Shiite Allawites and Iranians, but stranger things have happened especially when they share a common enemy in the region, namely the U.S., who are the only major power supporting the Kurds.
3. George Will recently wrote a couple of columns which sound strangely similar to a number of things I said in response to him and an academic named Henry R. Nau regarding foreign policy. Both of these columns take square aim at President Trump, so clearly there is an ulterior motive guiding his thought process here. But one of my objections to Nau's vision as endorsed by Will is that there are a great many things about the nations of the world which cannot be significantly altered by tweaking U.S. foreign policy. Will makes that very point repeatedly and at length in these two columns. If sowing doubt about the power of U.S. foreign policy among public intellectuals like George Will is all Donald Trump accomplishes with his presidency, it will be...dare I say worth it?
Now that's whack.
1. Donald Trump has asked Congress to create a sixth branch of the military focused on space called the Space Force. Readers may recall that this was one of planks of the Paddywhack Platform. I've seen a lot of funny stuff lately mocking the proposed "Space Force", but I stand by everything I wrote six years ago in 2012. The primary utility of space is communications through satellites. Virtually all military concerns regarding space revolve around earth-orbiting satellites. Due to the difficult nature of space travel, most of the time these satellites are operated remotely. This means any military operations in space will be heavily dependent on signals intelligence, i.e. hacking and cyberwarfare. The "Space Force" should therefore look a lot less like Star Wars and a lot more like a bunch of skinny bespectacled computer geeks sitting at computers. Given that this "Space Force" will already be focused on cyberwarfare due to the nature of warfare in space, it makes sense to grant the "Space Force" primacy in cyberwarfare, or cyberspace, as well as in space itself. If that's what Trump is after, then I wholeheartedly support it. Cyberwarfare is now more than ever a continuous national security concern with multiple state actors currently taking advantage of the inability of traditional U.S. defense institutions to combat them. It's past time we do something about that, at least six years past time.
2. The Turks have invaded Syria not to attack ISIS, but to attack the Kurds there. I came about as close to predicting this as I could have without actually doing so back in 2015. To quote myself:
"Turkey is far more likely to use military force against the Kurds than against ISIS, but they have been prevented from doing so because the U.S. supports the Kurds."
It is true that Turkey used to restrict themselves when dealing with the Kurds due to the U.S. That has obviously changed, probably because the Russian/Iranian/Allawite axis is the most powerful interest in Syria right now, and Turkey is consequently feeling much less inclined to restrict their behavior because of the U.S. The Russian axis is committed to Assad's government controlling all of Syria. The Kurds are an obstacle to that, and so Turkey is feeling much more confident conducting operations against the Kurds as long as they make it clear they have no long term territorial designs in Syria.
In addition, ISIS is now out of the picture, which has also changed Turkey's calculus. Quoting from myself again:
"Why did Turkey shoot down a Russian plane? Because Russia supports Assad against ISIS, and the Turks like ISIS. They are ideologically, religiously and ethnically aligned with ISIS, but more importantly, ISIS is fighting the Kurds."
No more ISIS? No more Turkish problem with the Russians. Again, as long as Turkey maintains no territorial interests intersecting with Assad, and they never had any in the first place, Turkish interests regarding the Syrian Kurds now align with the Russian axis in the region, and their primary conflict with the Russians has been rendered moot. We should begin to see Turkey aligning themselves closer to the Russians and farther from the U.S. in the future over the Kurdish question and the fact that while the Russians are maintaining a serious, long-term policy backed by hard power, the U.S. seems more interested in what the Kardashians are doing. It's hard to imagine Sunni Turkey finding much common cause with the Shiite Allawites and Iranians, but stranger things have happened especially when they share a common enemy in the region, namely the U.S., who are the only major power supporting the Kurds.
3. George Will recently wrote a couple of columns which sound strangely similar to a number of things I said in response to him and an academic named Henry R. Nau regarding foreign policy. Both of these columns take square aim at President Trump, so clearly there is an ulterior motive guiding his thought process here. But one of my objections to Nau's vision as endorsed by Will is that there are a great many things about the nations of the world which cannot be significantly altered by tweaking U.S. foreign policy. Will makes that very point repeatedly and at length in these two columns. If sowing doubt about the power of U.S. foreign policy among public intellectuals like George Will is all Donald Trump accomplishes with his presidency, it will be...dare I say worth it?
Now that's whack.
